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All over Eastern Europe, countries are in transition from communist political and eco-
nomic regimes to democratic market economies. Each country brings its own history and 
culture affecting the transition process in distinct ways. Hence, even though the transition 
economies have many common characteristics, there are country-specific features that 
should not be neglected. Notwithstanding the merits of generalization in modeling 
economic processes, careful analysis of specific institutions can help us understand real 
world phenomena in greater depth.  
  In this paper, we present such an analysis. In particular, we will study a politico- 
economic structure that is observed in a relatively small country, Albania. The history of 
this Balkan nation has developed a political culture and institutions that make it of great 
interest for scholars of political economics. In particular, the system is characterized by 
the existence of clans that affect both voter behavior and governmental policies. We shall 
argue that these clans had an influence in the non-democratic years as well as in the years 
of electoral competition.  
Aside from the country specific analysis, there are two more general contributions 
in this paper. First, it distinguishes the operation and influence of clans on politico-
economic outcomes from that of interest and ethnic groups. Second, we study the 
operation and influence of clans under both dictatorship and democracy. 
  The organization of this paper is as follows. In the next section we provide a 
description of Albania, and its political and economic history. Section 3 presents our 
analysis of clans. It starts with a description of this phenomenon in general and follows 
with an overview of the way Albanian clans have affected government policies on the 
one hand and voter behavior on the other. Section 4 concludes.  
 
II. Albania - A Politico-Economic Overview 
Albania is a small European country, located in the western part of the Balkan Peninsula, 
with -as any other country- its own specific history. Several detours, dead ends, shortcuts,   2 
 
severe struggles, unexpected outcomes and, especially, survival characterize its history. 
Noteworthy for the politico-economic analysis is that Albania has hardly ever had a 
democratic political system. This can be explained by the existence of antagonistic 
political and cultural entities. As a consequence of this internal division, this country has 
traditionally been used to satisfy the voracity of international powers.  
For the purpose of this study, we focus on the main developments of Albania after 
the Second World War. It is the politico-economic interaction in this era that we wish to 
describe and analyze. Though many characteristics of this system may be explained by 
the country’s previous history, it is not the goal of this paper to provide such explana-
tions.  
 
From Communist Dictatorship to Political Pluralism 
A combination of external conditions created by the Second World War and internal 
contradictions within the new Albania produced Albanian communism. For about four 
decades, Albania was a completely isolated country, due to the highly repressive 
communist regime of Enver Hoxha. The political regime was a dictatorial one, while the 
economic system was completely socialized. No other country in Eastern Europe had a 
socialisation of property as complete as Albania did.
1 Consequently, in the early 1990s, 
Albania was the last of the Central and Eastern European countries to allow political 
pluralism, establish democratic institutions and introduce market mechanisms. 
It is quite difficult to pinpoint the exact year in which real political pluralism and 
economic reforms started. In fact, democratic reforms (including the introduction of 
political pluralism) began in 1990, as a result of the massive request for changes. Often, 
however, the 1992 elections are considered to be the real start of the changes, because 
this is when the communists had to transfer their power to the opposition.
2  It was at this 
time that, after forty-five years of monocracy, the first opposition party was established, 
namely the Democratic Party of Albania (DPA), led by Sali Berisha. As a consequence of 
                                                           
1 For a survey of this period, see Schnytzer, 1982. 
2 In fact, there were democratic elections in 1991, as well. These were won by the communist party. This is 
partly due to their support from rural areas, where communist sympathies remained strong and where more 
than 60% of the population is located.  Furthermore, it is generally agreed, that the time between the start of 
the reforms in 1990 and these 1991 elections was too short to allow new and inexperienced parties to set up 
an organizational structure and develop resources that would allow for a successful electoral campaign.    3 
 
the grave political and economic recession that Albania suffered in the last years of 
communist rule, the DPA won the democratic elections in 1992 by a landslide.
3 
Following these elections, the Albanian people had great hopes for the future of 
democracy in their nation, counting on the flexibility and diplomacy of the new political 
elite.  
While the DPA was in office (1992-1997), dozens of new parties were 
established, an open foreign policy was followed and democratic freedom was provided 
to everybody, at least at the beginning of DPA’s governance.
4 Notwithstanding the 
establishment of new parties, the biggest opposition party in Albania – until 1997 - was 
the Socialist Party of Albania (SPA), led by Fatos Nano. The majority of its members 
came from the former communist party. This is why the SPA did not have a significant 
support from the population, at the beginning of transition. However, in contrast to the 
small parties, the SPA succeeded in maintaining a level of support above that of a small 
group of resistant activists. In fact, the SPA electorate was growing during the DPA 
governance and “the government could do nothing to shake the loyalty of its traditional 
southern strongholds or the support of dispossessed urban workers who could not find 
jobs or emigration opportunities” (Vickers and Pettifer, 1997). The political and 




In terms of economics, the new democratic government started the implementation of a 
profound market-oriented economic program, including macroeconomic stabilization and 
price liberalization
6. In light of the high expectations of the Albanian people and the very 
poor state the country’s economy was in, this government applied a ‘shock therapy’. 
However, a ‘big-bang’ or ’shock therapy’ strategy may undermine popular support and 
may unnecessarily lead to reform reversal (Dewatripont & Roland, 1995). Furthermore, 
fast reforms often stress speed at the cost of institutional balance (Nuti, 1996). This is 
                                                           
3 See the appendix for a description of the Albanian political parties and electoral system. 
4 For more details, see section 3.  
5 Of course, one important failure of the DPA government was the existence and collapse of the Ponzi 
Schemes. An analysis of these schemes is beyond the scope of the present paper (see Sadiraj, 1999, for 
more information).  Schnytzer (1999) argues that the DPA policy towards Ponzi schemes may be related to 
a reallocation of funds from the south to the north.    4 
 
what happened in Albania. Former institutions vanished before fundamental new institu-
tions had time to develop. For example, Sadiraj (1999) argues that proper financial 
institutions were missing.  
Aside from political pressure, the Albanian people also suffered from a deep 
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This was definitely a time for starting economic reforms. One of the main 
strategies considered by the government in order to reach its goal of stabilization and 
liberalization was privatization and the development of the private sector. This was 
considered to be the most important institutional change in transition to a market 
economy.
7 In fact, however, the privatization process was also used by the democratic 
government to increase its popularity through various economic and political favors to 
certain individuals, strata and social groups (Shala, 1997 & the Ministry of Public 
Economics and Privatization, 1997). In fact, this is a first example of how clan policies 
play an important role in the Albanian electoral competition.  
Table 1 presents the main macro-economic indicators of the 1990s. It shows how 
the DPA managed to turn around the economic decline reasonably well after coming to 
power in 1992. Especially successful were the results with respect to hyperinflation and 
unemployment. On the other hand, major problems still existed up to 1997, with respect 
to the trade balance and budget deficit. All in all, table 1 appears to show that the 
economic policy of the DPA government was a success, however. Nevertheless, this table 
only shows the aggregate numbers. There are various reasons why reality may have been  
                                                                                                                                                                             
6 The development of the economy is discussed in more detail, below. 
7 “We consider it (the privatization process) as the final split of Albania from the former communist 
planned economy and establishment of a ‘popular capitalist’ system” (Berisha, as quoted in “Rilindja 
Demokratike” newspaper, 10-1-1995).   5 
 
Table 1. Some macroeconomic indicators for the period 1990-1997 
  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Real GDP growth ( %)  -10.0  -28.0  -7,2 11.0 8.3  13.3 8.9  -7.0 
Rate of inflation (average)  0  35,5 226  85  22.5 7.8  12.7 42.1 
Exchange rate (Lek/USD)  8.9  24,2 75  102.1  94.7 92,8 104.5  149.1 
Trade balance (Mil. USD)  -150 -308 -471 -490 -460 -475 -692 -490 
Unemployment rate (%)  --  30 --  22 19 13 12 17 
Budget deficit (% GDP)  -15.4 -30.7 -21,5 -13.7 -9.0  -8.7  -11.3 -12.2 
Source: Gajo (1999) as obtained from Ministry of Finance, 1998 and Institute of Statistics, 1997.   
 
 
less positive than these aggregate indicators seem to imply.  
•  First of all, it was relatively easy to get impressive growth rates, due to the very poor 
initial state of the economy.  
•  Second, the official unemployment rate is relatively low due to a very widespread 
informal labor market (Gërxhani, 1998).  
•  Third, migration and international financial assistance also had a positive effect on 
the economic indicators in the early years.  
•  Vaughan-Whitehead (1999) provide a fourth reason by arguing that the systematic 
presentation of higher figures by the democratic government was a political 
manoeuvre. 
•  Finally, Vaughan-Whitehead (1999) also argues that the impressive figures of table 1 
were achieved at the very high costs of social dimensions. 
  
All in all, it would appear that the success of the Albanian reform may have been more 
superficial than generally assumed.  
 
Whatever the extent of actual success by the DPA government, the economic results were 
demolished in 1997, when a collapse of the so-called Ponzi schemes led to complete 
economic and political chaos in Albania. In this paper, we do not wish to address this 
most recent phase in Albanian history (a detailed analysis is given by Sadiraj, 1999).   6 
 
Instead, we focus on the post-war communist period (dictatorship) and the electoral 
competition (democracy) in the period 1990-1997. 
 
 
III. Clans in Albanian Politics 
 
Clans, Partisans, and Non-partisans 
To some extent, political power is used in most countries to redistribute welfare in order 
to gain and maintain political support. In western democracies this is often institutio-
nalized by either fixed constituencies (electoral districts) or through the role of interest 
groups or both. It is generally recognized that politicians actively represent the interests 
of their constituencies or of specific groups. Voters are assumed to decide on what party 
to support by considering some individual specific trade-off between private and general 
interests.  
  Interest groups constitute one way in which specific groups are related to certain 
political parties. Another way is through ethnic or religious voting. In this case voting is 
based on an ethnic or religious relationship between voters and specific parties. In fact, to 
a large extent voters make a decision about what party to vote for independent of the 
policies pursued by the party. Only policies with respect to race or religion are relevant. 
Direct relationships between parties and voters do not need to exist.
8  
Interest groups and ethnic voting can be seen as two extremes of group-related  
voting. The term ‘clans’ is often used to describe a phenomenon that takes an 
intermediate position between the two. Clans have a much closer internal relationship 
than interest groups. People in a clan can be related through kinship, culture, religion, 
race and language, as well as through political interests. This makes the ties much 
stronger than in interest groups. On the other hand, clans are not only related to parties 
through ethnic bonds. The ties are not as strong as with ethnic voting. Moreover, much 
more than with ethnic voting, the relationship is based on policies favoring the clan.  
 
                                                           
8 Note that this is an extreme representation. We are not claiming that ethnic voting as described here is a 
large scale phenomenon in ‘developed’ democracies. It does exist, however. For example, there are small 
religious parties in the Netherlands that can rely on a fixed group of voters (based on their religious 
denomination) no matter what policies they pursue.    7 
 
Note that, interest groups, ethnic voting groups and clans are theoretical concepts. In 
practice they are not always completely distinct. Many groups in the real world will be a 
hybrid form of interest groups and clans or of clans and ethnic groups. Nevertheless, the 
distinction is useful. It provides a guideline to base discussions on. 
 
Our conception of the clan phenomenon has the following consequences. 
 
•  Contrary to interest groups, members of a clan are sensitive to which party is favoring 
them. Because of the ‘extra-political’ ties, they will act less strongly to unfavorable 
policies by their ‘own’ party than by some other party. Note that this is not generally 
thought to be the case with interest groups. On the other hand, as argued above, other 
policies than those with respect to race, play a less important role with ethnic groups 
than with clans. 
•  The consequence of the existence of clans goes beyond the clan members themselves. 
The relationship between people in a clan is very close, but they are generally thought 
to be relatively small compared to the complete electorate. However, there are also 
many voters who are less closely related to a clan but who profit from party policies 
favoring it. For example, a clan policy might allocate funds to a region, profiting 
many non-clan members as well. These voters will determine their party choice in a 
way that is similar to that of the clan members, even though it is less strongly linked 
to a specific party. We refer to this group as ‘partisans’. Like clans, their voting 
behavior depends on both the policies (and the extent to which they profit from them) 
and the party undertaking the policy.
9 Though the effect is less strong than with clan 
members, they are less likely to ‘reward’ or ‘punish’ the party related to them than the 
other parties. Because the group of partisans related to a clan is much larger than the 
clan itself, the political influence of clans goes far beyond their own numerical 
strength. 
•  There is also a group of voters that is not related to a clan. We refer to these as the 
‘non-partisans’. They are assumed to determine their vote based on general economic 
                                                           
9 Note that most interest group models assume that voting depends on policies but not on the party con-
cerned.   8 
 
conditions. As a consequence, if clan policy is thought to be detrimental to the 
general economic development, these voters will oppose any such policy. 
 
Until now we have provided a general description of clans and related phenomena in a 
political system. A common element is that politicians favor specific groups of voters. 
The way in which this occurs might vary across countries, however, possibly depending 
on a country’s political stability.  
One way to see the influence of political stability is by using the game theoretic 
setting of Myerson (1993). He shows that equilibria can exist where politicians make 
campaign promises to special interest groups. He argues, however, that rational 
expectations imply that political candidates must make promises that they can actually 
fulfill if elected. This assumption may be valid for well-established democracies. In 
fragile politically unstable democracies like Albania, promises of political candidates are 
more difficult to enforce, ex post. There are external circumstances and institutional 
instabilities that make it very difficult to follow up on promised and planned policies. 
Voters are aware of this and of the fact that this agency problem makes it easier for 
candidates to renege on campaign promises. Hence, the Myerson analysis is not 
applicable. This may lead voters to support candidates with whom they have extra 
electoral relationships – say candidates from a clan. This might explain why the role of 
clans is much stronger in countries in transition than in established democracies.  
 
Clans in Albania  
Historically, Albania has always been a divided society. As is often observed, the 
division is partly geographical (in this case between north and south). However, this 
division appears to be more than simply that. For example, at the start of the 1920s, the 
northern part of Albania consisted mainly of conservative landowners and tribal 
‘bajraktars’
10, who were led by Ahmed Zogu (the later King of Albania). The southern 
part consisted of liberal intellectuals, democratic politicians, and progressive merchants 
                                                           
10 ‘Bajraktars’ is the Albanian name for northern landowners and leaders who governed the northern 
Albania based on age-old institution of the blood feud and the patriarchal structure of the family.   9 
 
who looked towards the West.
11 This division provides a basis for the clan culture. Even 
though this basis is no longer a strict division in north and south, many argue that there is 
still an important geographical element (Shala, 1997). On the other hand, some (e.g. 
Rama, 1997) argue that there is only a strong cultural ‘north-south’ division
12, unless 
politicians politicize the cultural difference to manipulate the electorate. In our view, this 
politicization is exactly what is happening in Albania.  
 
Therefore, we now proceed to consider the evidence of a southern clan (supporting the 
communists and, subsequently, the SPA) and a northern clan (supporting the DPA)
13. The 
arguments presented above make the following predictions. First, government policies in 
both the communist and the democratic period favored clans with partisan spillovers to 
the south and north, respectively. Second, there will be a reluctance to vote against one’s 
own or in favor of the other clan’s party. We start with qualitative evidence of clan-based 
policies. This is followed by statistical evidence in support of the predicted voter 
behavior.  
 
Clan Policies  
There is mainly qualitative evidence that clans played a role in the policies pursued by 
the communist regime in spite of one of its main goals: socialization of the whole society. 
The idea here, is that the communists favored the southern clan. The following 
observations support this notion. 
 
•  Hoxha’s origin is from the south. His political, economic and social policies strongly 
favored his southern clan, families and regions. The elite formed under communism 
originally came from Tirana and the Tosk south, where the communist led Partisan 
movement had been strongest (Vickers and Pettifer, 1997).
14 Consider, for example 
                                                           
11 Of course, the majority in the North and South consisted of peasants. However, cultural and political 
developments in each region were mainly determined by the non-peasants.  
12 Note that one possible element of this cultural division is also the existence of two main linguistic 
dialects – Gheg and Tosk – spoken in the north and south, respectively.  
13 We do not exclude the fact that they might exist more than one clan per region. What we say is that there 
are two major clans, whose influence is worth analyzing in this paper. Government policies supporting one 
clan will have spillover effects to other clans and partisans in the region concerned. 
14An exception to this observation is Alia, who was born in the northern city of Shkodër.   10 
 
the composition of the Politbureau in the communist era. In the 6 Politbureaus (with 5 
year terms) while Hoxha was in power (1956-1961 until 1981-1986) the number of 
member varied between 15 and 19. Of the 100 members in total, 82 (82%) came from 
the south and 18 (18%) from the center or north. In contrast, of the 45 members of the 
two DPA governments in the 1992-1996 period, 26 (58%) came from the south and 
19 (42%) from the center or north.
15  
•  Hoxha’s leadership extended the new socialist order to the more rough and isolated 
northern highlands, bringing down the age-old institution of the blood canon and the 
patriarchal structure in the northern clan and destroying the semi-feudal class of 
bajraktars. As a result, anti-communism was always stronger in the north than in the 
south.  
•  Geographically, the north of Albania borders undeveloped territories of the former 
Yugoslavia and it consists mainly of highlands. Climatically, it is characterized by a 
very cold winter and a cool summer. For these reasons, it has traditionally been easier 
to economically develop the south than the north. Hence, the north has always been 
an economically underdeveloped region. The communist government made no effort 
to change this. Hence, even economically, the northern population was much more 
discontented than the southern one.  
 
All in all, at the end of the communist era, the Albanian society was polarized. This 
appears to have been at least partly a consequence of the regime applying policies that 
favored one particular clan. Because there were no free elections, this clan policy could 
not result in electoral defeat in future elections. This implies that the situation was 
different from that in the democratic period which followed.  
 
The ‘wind of change’ in Albania started in 1990. Massive bloodshed and confrontation 
were avoided, partly because similar processes were taking place all over Eastern Europe, 
but mainly as a consequence of the peaceful way in which Alia (Hoxha’s successor) gave 
up power. The communists resigned, making it possible for Albania to integrate its 
politics and institutions with the West, which many Albanians have historically viewed as 
                                                           
15These numbers were obtained from Enver Hoxha’s reports to the Central Committee of the Labor Party of   11 
 
their cultural and geographic home. The electorate entrusted this national commitment to 
the new democrats of the DPA, led by Sali Berisha, by supporting them significantly in 
the general elections of 1992. 
The newly emerging Albanian political elite was mostly composed of last minute 
converted members of the former Communist intelligentsia without any significant 
political experience (Rama, 1997). However, it also included part of the population that 
was previously excluded by the communist elite. The most trustworthy structures for the 
new politicians were their families and relatives, and many pacts went through them 
(Shala, 1997). The new party (DPA) grew on the basis of traditional loyalties, with the 
communists soon facing disintegration in northern areas such as Shkodër, with its long 
history of right-wing support
16, while in communist strongholds in the south as Fier and 
Berat, the DPA only developed slowly (Vickers and Pettifer, 1997). This provided a 
fertile starting point for the enforcement of clan policy by this democratically chosen 
government.  
Indeed, Berisha’s origin is from the north, and he appeared to favor the clan 
whose major support is in the north, just like Hoxha had favored the other clan. Even 
though many agree that such clan policy was undertaken by Berisha (e.g. Rama, 1997), it 
is not easy to get hard evidence for it. Below, we will present some economic data which 
appear to support this assertion. First, we discuss other policies that have been argued to 
imply that Berisha favored the northern clan. 
 
In contrast to the southern communist elite, the key positions in pluralist Albania were 
held by northerners.
17 According to Vickers and Pettifer (1997), nobody could have 
anticipated the scale of nepotism in Berisha’s administration. They claim that every 
ministry and institution was loaded with northerners and professed DPA loyalists, and 
that their appointment to ministerial office and other positions was accompanied by a vast 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Albania, for their 3rd - 8th Congresses as well as from Vickers and Pettifer, 1997. 
16 This northern city holds the largest catholic community (10%) in Albania, which has historically had 
strong relationship with the west and therefore always maintained a bad relationship with communism.  
17 Of course, some key positions are in the government. Though 26 of the 45 government positions in this 
period were occupied by people from the south, these were mostly less important positions than the ones 
occupied by politicians from the north.   12 
 
migration from the north to Tirana as families sought to capitalize on family members 
and friends who were now holding high office in the capital.  
In fact, it is generally thought that Berisha’s origin
18 combined with the previous 
communists’ clan policy had an important influence on the extent of his clan policy. It is 
certainly the case that - even though Berisha was a former communist himself
19 - under 
his leadership, the DPA started a very painful anti-communist reform when it came to 
power. This led to a polarization of the Albanian society in two main and antagonistic 
groups: pro- and anti- communism. To quite some extent, this polarization ran parallel to 
the division in clans.  
During his regime, the clan policy increased over time and started to lead to 
objections from the opposition’s clan, from independent, non-clan citizens (non-
partisans), and from members of Berisha’s own party who were not part of his clan. In 
turn, this led Berisha to undertake dictatorial measures. Examples are the imprisonment 
of the leader of the opposition, and an (ill-fated) attempt to define a constitution to his 
own advantage. This led to growing unrest in Albanian society as a whole and within the 
DPA in particular. 
20 
 
As for economic policies, it has been argued that the short-term goals typically pursued in 
transition economies are more easily achieved by redistributive activities than by 
productive ones (Knaack, 1996). This appears to be true for Albania in the period under 
consideration. In fact, the DPA appears to have redistributed funds in favor of the 
northern clan (Ministry of Public Economics and Privatization, 1997). 
To some extent, this appears in the data on unemployment. No official 
                                                           
18 Vickers and Pettifer (1997) argue that Berisha’s origin from the north-eastern highland dictates his app-
roach to politics, where highland clans are firmly bonded together, and absolute loyalty to blood relations is 
unquestioned. 
19 He was considered a hard-line communist during his 12 years as a member of the communist party 
(PLA). See Vickers and Pettifer (1997) for evidence. 
20 Another piece of evidence of clan policy was suggested by Adi Schnytzer. It is related to Berisha’s 
alliance with the self-proclaimed King of Albania, Leka Zogu. After being ignored several times by 
Berisha’s regime, Zogu was suddenly invited by Berisha to participate in the general elections of 1997. One 
possible explanation is that Zogu – previously considered (by Berisha) as a political competitor regarding 
northern votes - later (in difficult times of 1997) appeared to be a helpful collaborator to win the votes of 
hard-core Royalists, who are mainly located in the north.   13 
 
unemployment existed during the communist regime.
21 A comparison of the rate of 
unemployment in 1993 with that in 1996 gives some insight in the effects of the DPA 
policies, which should have a stronger effect in 1996. A first observation is that the 
unemployment rate reduced significantly for the whole country in these three years, from 
over 22% to under 13%. Though all regions profited, the effect was strongest for the 
North, where the unemployment rate reduced by 12 percentage points. In the rest of the 
nation, the rate reduced by only 9 percentage points. Hence, the relative position of the 
north improved. The latter observation is also supported by the fact that the percentage of 
the total unemployed that lived in the north declined from 32.5% to 28.6% between 1993 
and 1996, even though the proportion of the population living in the north remained 
stable at about 29%.
22 
Other evidence is given by the extent in which social assistance was provided by 
the government to inhabitants of various regions. Whereas 35.3% of the population in 
northern regions received such support in 1994, only 11.2% of the population in the 
southern districts received assistance (Gajo, 1999). In this year, the unemployment rate 
was only slightly higher in the north than in the south.  
 
Clans and Voter Behavior  
 
As argued above, one of the characteristics of a clan culture is the distinct voting 
behavior of various groups. Especially the voting behavior of partisans (distinct across 
the different clans) is politically important. In order to analyze this behavior, we consider 
the election result per region for the Albanian general elections in 1996 and 1997
23 and 
classify the 35 electoral districts into three regions: northern (12 districts), central (12) 
                                                           
21 Hobdari (1998) presents unemployment rates of around 10% for the last years of this regime. He only 
presents aggregate data for this period, however. The data used for the discussion here were provided by 
the Albanian Center for Economic Research. 
22 Of course, these numbers do not formally prove that policies in favor of the northern clan were being 
undertaken. There might be other explanations. Nevertheless, given the fact that it is very difficult to get 
reliable economic data for Albania, we cannot statistically test this hypothesis against others. We believe 
that clan policy provides a straightforward explanation for the numbers given, however.  
23We are grateful to the Albanian Ministry of local government for providing us with the political data. The 
1996 elections are often thought to be characterized by a lot of fraud. The 1997 elections followed the 
massive unrest after the collapse of the Ponzi Schemes. Nevertheless, the results we obtain show systematic 
and interpretable differences across regions and relationships between the economy and voting.    14 
 
and southern (11). 
24 Table 2 summarizes the election results per region. 
 
Table 2: Election results for DPA relative to SPA 
 1996  1997 
North  65.2 45.3 
Central  62.9 27.1 
South  48.4 17.8 
Total  59.1 30.4 
Note: The numbers represent the votes for DPA as a percentage of votes for DPA and SPA.  
 
The table shows an enormous decrease in the popularity of the DPA between the two 
elections (the SPA won the elections in 1997 after the DPA lost almost half of its 
support). The difference across regions is also remarkable. Independent sample t-tests 
(with unequal variance) show that all pair wise differences are statistically significant at 
the 1% level except the difference between the northern and central regions in 1996 and 
the difference between the central and southern regions in 1997. Support for the DPA is 
therefore significantly lower in the south than in the north. This supports the notion of a 
northern clan and partisans linked to the DPA and a southern clan and partisans related to 
the SPA.  
The idea of a clan’s influence on voting behavior is not just that the percentage of 
votes is higher in the region concerned. It is also hypothesized that the voters react 
differently to policies by the party concerned, dependent on the clan they relate to. In 
Albania, this would imply that voters in the south would react differently to DPA policies 
than voters in the north. In the south, partisans are assumed to react very strongly to 
economic swings attributed to the DPA government because they are more sensitive to 
these policies than a non-partisan would be. Partisans in the north have a strong alliance 
with the DPA irrespective of its policies. The central region can be expected to take an 
intermediate position. The reason is that it is generally assumed that clans and partisans 
play a less important role in the center than in the north or south. Hence, there are more 
                                                           
24We could not use the electoral data from the region Kurbin (in the North), because the economic data for 
this region (needed for the analysis that follows) were missing.   15 
 
non-partisans in the center and their reaction to policies is not influenced by clan 
motivations in the way voting in the north and south is. Their voting behavior is mostly 
affected by the general economic situation in the country. To test these hypotheses, we 














p denotes the vote share of party p in district i in 1996 or 1997, j denotes the 
region (j=1,2,3 denote the northern, central, and southern regions, respectively) that i lies 
in, D97 is a dummy representing the 1997 elections, Un
i denotes the unemployment rate 
in 1996 or 1997 in district i and ε
i is a white noise error term. The coefficients β 0, and β
j
1, 
will be estimated. Note that we allow the coefficients concerning the unemployment rate 
to vary across regions. This allows us to test the hypothesis that not only the party choice 
as such (as indicated by the t-tests mentioned above), but also the voters’ reaction to 
unemployment may differ across regions.
25 Defining the null hypothesis that voting 
patterns are the same across regions, with the hypotheses described in the previous 
paragraph as the alternative this yields: 
 






1 < 0, 








For completeness’ sake, we first estimated the model imposing the H0 restriction that β
j
1 
is constant across regions. This gives β 0=0.641 (t=3.532), β 97 = -1.259 (t=-6.722), and 
β 1= -2.205 (t=-1.898). Hence, a higher unemployment decreases support for the 
governing party DPA, though the effect is not statistically significant at the 1%-level. As 
could be expected from the election results, there is a strong effect of the 1997 election 
dummy. The explanatory power of this model is relatively low (R
2=0.469). 
The explanatory power increases substantially (R
2=0.707) when we allow the 
coefficients to vary across regions. Table 3 presents the estimation results. 
                                                           
25We are grateful to the Albanian Center for Economic Research (ACER) for providing us with detailed 
economic data that allow us to undertake these tests.   16 
 
Table 3: Estimated popularity functions 
Variable Coefficient  Absolute  t-value 
Constant 0.653  4.553* 
β 97  -1.255 8.690* 
β
north
1  1.802 1.497 
β
central
1  -2.845 3.111* 
β
south
1  -6.569 4.831* 
Note: * indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 
These results show important differences across regions. In the northern districts, voters 
react positively to unemployment, though the coefficient is not statistically significant at 
conventional levels. In the central and southern regions negative responses to the 
unemployment level are observed. The strongest (negative) response is found for the 
southern districts. A formal test of H0 versus H1 shows that the equalities in H0 are 
rejected in favor of the inequalities of H1 (p<0.01). This supports our notion of two clans, 
based mainly in the north and south, where Berisha’s DPA is supported mainly by the 
northern clan. In that case, we expect his own clan (in the north) to be less sensitive to 
unemployment differences than the opposing clan (in the south). This is what we observe. 
The fact that we find intermediate results for the central region can be explained by the 
hypothesized relatively large number of non-partisans there.  
 
 
IV. Concluding discussion  
 
The specific history of any nation - but especially of nations in transition - is very 
important to understand its politico-economic development. In one way or another, each 
country has its own pattern. Therefore, it can be very useful when studying the politico-
economic interaction to take account of the country specific institutions that have 
developed over the years. In this paper, we have focussed on the institutions that occur in 
a nation in transition from a communist regime to a free market democracy, Albania.  
   One important element of the pattern throughout Albania’s history in the second 
half of the 20th century is the existence of political clans. We have argued that the clans   17 
 
have a significant influence in Albania. This was the case both during the communist 
regime and in the democratic era that started in the early 1990s.  
Clan-based politics lead to an exaggeration of the usual redistributive tendencies 
of regional-based politics. In particular, one gets more extreme redistribution among 
regions, but also much more extreme inefficient redistribution among supporters (e.g. 
high levels of corruption or huge losses due to patronage). These inefficient outcomes 
appear to be more extreme in a country like Albania -whose political system is 
characterized by the existence of clans– than in countries where clans are not so 
pronounced. 
All in all, to understand Albanian government policies one must therefore take the 
existence and influence of clans into account. Though electoral competition might affect 
such policies and cause a shift towards politics in which interest groups instead of 
traditional clans are important, clans have been and are important for understanding both 
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Appendix: Politics in Albania 
 
Albania lacks a tradition of party formation. Under the communist regime, opposition forces and dissident 
behavior were eliminated very effectively. The political system was based on a monocracy. Therefore, at 
the beginning of the ‘wind of change’, Albanian politics was undergoing a new experience.  
 
Parties  
During the Communist period, there was only one party involved in Albanian politics, the Labor Party of 
Albania. This party was governed by communists, who did not allow a multi-party political system. The 
democratic changes after 1990 brought pluralism to Albanian politics. Since 1992, dozens of new parties 
have been established. Nevertheless, there are only two main parties with significant influence in Albania, 
the Socialist Party of Albania (SPA) and the Democratic Party of Albania (DPA). The following is a brief 
description of the six most important political parties in Albania.  
 
- DPA. The first democratic party, established in 1991, was the Democratic Party of Albania (DPA). Its 
initial and current leader is Mr. Sali Berisha. DPA is a right wing oriented party with a propensity to 
democratic ideas. It draws support from all social strata. Imitating the former communist regime, the 
Democratic Party has created its own class of party-dependents. DPA was the leading party in 
government, during the period 1992-1997. There have been a lot of conflicts within the party, which 
have resulted in the formation of several internal antagonistic fractions. DPA claims to support a 
social-market economy. However, de facto, they applied the ‘shock therapy’ approach. The DPA has 
been continuously supported by international organizations. Since 1997, DPA is the largest opposition 
party in Albania.  
- SPA. The Socialist Party of Albania is the result of a renovation of the former communist party, the 
Labor Party of Albania. The party re-named itself in 1991 and since then, its leader is Mr. Fatos Nano. 
Its main support comes from rural areas (mainly in the south). Being the successor of the previous 
communist party, besides inheriting the majority of its members
26, it has also inherited the 
communists’ organizational and institutional structures. Consequently, SPA is the largest political 
institution in Albania. However, this inheritance has its own disadvantages, namely the internal 
conflict between the more conservative group and the reformist one. The economic policy of the SPA 
is more socially market oriented than that of the DPA, considering the ‘gradualist’ approach preferred 
by the socialists. Since 1997, the Socialist Party of Albania is the leading party in the government.  
- SDPA.  The Social-Democratic Party of Albania is a left-center-oriented party, a current ally of the 
Socialist Party in government;  
- DA.  The Democratic Alliance is a right-center oriented party, a current ally of the Socialist Party as 
well; 
                                                           
26 About 40 percent of the current membership was member of the Labor Party of Albania.    21 
 
- RP.  The Republican Party is a right oriented party, traditionally an ally of the Democratic Party, but 
currently independent. 
- PHR.  Party of Human Rights, a representative of Greek minorities in Albania.  
 
Parliamentary and Electoral System 
In 1990 and 1991, popular protests forced the communist party to allow democracy in Albania. The 
electoral system –including the number of seats in parliament and the balance between single member 
districts and proportional representation-  has changed continuously in the 1990s. Throughout this period, a 
single chamber parliament within a republic was maintained, however. More information about the 
electoral system can be found in Rama 1997.  
The first democratic elections, held in March 1991, were won by the Labor Party of Albania. It 
won a majority of 68 percent (169 seats out of a 250-member single chamber parliament). On March 22
nd, 
1992, the second democratic elections were held, in which the DPA won a majority of 62 percent of the 
votes (yielding 92 out of 140 seats) compared to 26 percent for the SPA. The general elections of May 26
th, 
1996 were again won by the DPA, who obtained 56% of the votes (20% for the SPA) and 122 out of 140 
seats (10 for the SPA). Intimidation and fraud in favor of the ruling party were generally thought to have 
characterized these elections. Under international pressure, new elections were held in 1997. These took 
place after the collapse of the Ponzi schemes and the SPA won by a landslide, obtaining 52,8 percent of the 
votes and 99 out of 155 seats. The current government is a coalition of mainly left-oriented parties, where 
the Socialist Party dominates.  